Oil Prices and Venezuela's Economy by Mark Weisbrot & Rebecca Ray








Oil Prices and Venezuela’s Economy  
Mark Weisbrot and Rebecca Ray 
 
November 2008* 
















Center for Economic and Policy Research 
1611 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 400 
Washington, D.C. 20009 
202-293-5380 




















About the Authors 
Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director and an Economist and Rebecca Ray is a Research Assistant at the 




The authors would like to thank Luis Sandoval and Dan Beeton for editorial and research assistance. 
   Oil Prices and Venezuela’s Economy • 2 
Introduction 
 
The Venezuelan economy has grown more than 94 percent since the current expansion began in the 
second quarter of 2003.
1 The overwhelming bulk of this growth has been in the non-oil sector.
2  
Throughout most of these five and a half years of unprecedented growth, the economy has often 
been characterized as an “oil boom about to go bust,” and predictions of collapse have been 
commonplace and often repeated. These have become more numerous of late since oil prices have 
fallen nearly 50 percent from a peak of over $130 in July to their current $64.48 per barrel.
3 The 
current financial crisis, worldwide stock market collapse, and recession in the United States, Europe, 
and Japan have also added to gloomy predictions for the region, including Venezuela. 
 
Venezuela does not receive any significant foreign investment from the United States or other 
countries that have been hard-hit by the financial crisis and economic slowdown. The most 
important, and practically the only, direct impact of these external events on Venezuela is through 
oil prices. Petroleum exports are currently about 93 percent of Venezuela’s exports.
4 
 
The relevant question for Venezuela is therefore how far oil prices would have to fall before the 
country would begin to run an unsustainable current account deficit. This is the binding constraint 
for developing countries. In other words, the United States, Europe, and Japan will – inasmuch as 
they choose to do so – pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, including deficit 
government spending, in order to counteract the current recession. Developing countries can and 
ideally should do the same, but unlike these rich countries, they face a constraint due to the fact that 
their national currencies are not “hard” currencies. Therefore they cannot count on being able to 
borrow nearly as much, relative to GDP, or for so long a period of time, as countries with hard 
currencies, to cover their import needs. For this reason, the current account
5 – not the central 
government budget, which can be covered in local currency – is the most important and binding 
constraint on developing countries such as Venezuela in the present situation.  
 




Figure 1 shows Venezuelan export revenues under various oil price scenarios. For simplicity, we 
assume that non-oil exports, which are about seven percent of export revenues, remain constant at 
$6.5 billion per year.
6  
                                                 
1 Banco Central de Venezuela (2008). 
2 Weisbrot and Sandoval (2008). 
3 Venezuelan Energy and Petroleum Ministry (2008). 
4 Banco Central de Venezuela (2008). 
5 The current account balance is dominated by the trade balance, i.e. exports of goods and services minus imports; there 
are other items including debt service payments which will be accounted for below. 
6 Non-petroleum exports were $6.61 billion USD in 2007 and $6.77 billion USD in 2006. (Banco Central de Venezuela, 
2008).  Figures are shown in US dollars unless otherwise noted. Center for Economic and Policy Research  • 3 
 
Figure 1  
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Upper bound: exporting 2.89 mbd
 
Source: Venezuelan Central Bank (2008) and authors’ calculations.   
Note: Sums include $6.5 billion USD in annual non-petroleum exports.   
 
The Upper Bound: 2.89 Million Barrels per Day 
 
For the volume of exports, we show export levels of 2.62 and 2.89 million barrels per day.  The 
larger number is reported in PDVSA’s most recent financial report.
 7 There has been some dispute 
about how much oil Venezuela exports, with some press reports claiming that the true number is as 
low as 1.7 million barrels per day.
8  In order to check the accuracy of PDVSA's reporting, we first 
compared PDVSA’s export numbers with import figures for the largest countries that import oil 
from  Venezuela.  The  US  Energy  Information  Administration  reports  OECD  imports  from 
Venezuela to be 2.0 million barrels per day.  In an independent financial statement, PDVSA reports 
exporting the same amount to OECD countries.
9  China is the other large market for Venezuelan 
petroleum. While China has not released complete import figures for 2007 or 2008, the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce reported in May of 2008 that China was importing 350 thousand barrels per 
day from Venezuela in 2007, which matches PDVSA’s reported exports to China.
10 Thus, there does 
not appear to be any basis for the claim that Venezuela’s oil exports are overstated by PDVSA.  We 
take PDVSA’s reported exports, 2.89 million barrels per day, as the upper bound of export volume, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
                                                 
7 PDVSA (2008). 
8 For example, Forero (2008) reports that “most oil analysts put the [production] figure below 2.4 million, with more 
than 700,000 barrels of that sold daily in Venezuela at subsidized prices.” 
9 US Energy Information Administration (2008a), PDVSA (2007).  The EIA figures include the U.S. Virgin Islands but 
not the Dutch Antilles.  The PDVSA figures are listed separately for each country, allowing a recreation of the EIA’s list. 
10 PDVSA (b), People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce (2008). Oil Prices and Venezuela’s Economy • 4 
 
The Lower Bound: 2.62 Million Barrels per Day 
 
With PDVSA’s reported export volume confirmed, the only remaining necessary adjustment is to 
account for PetroCaribe, a program that sells oil on credit, with highly favorable financing terms, to 
13 Caribbean nations. Since at least some of this oil does not generate current revenue, and the 
purpose of the accounting in this paper is to estimate Venezuela’s current account balance, we can 
subtract some of this oil from the export totals.  No more than half of the oil exported through 
PetroCaribe is financed through deferred payments, so we can discount half of Venezuela’s exports 




PDVSA’s most recent financial statement puts exports to Caribbean countries at 0.54 million barrels 
per day.  Subtracting half of this amount (0.27 million barrels per day) from our upper bound gives a 
lower bound of 2.62 million barrels per day. 
 
Figure 1 shows Venezuela’s export revenue based on these two estimates of oil export volume, for 
prices ranging from $60 to $90 per barrel for Venezuela’s oil. Venezuela’s oil sold for 10.4 percent 
less than the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) price in 2007.
12 The current  price for WTI 
oil is $65.66; estimates from Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and the International Energy Agency 
predict WTI prices of between $80 and $100 per barrel for 2009.
13  
 
Imports and Trade Balances 
 
Table 1 shows the import side of the equation, and the current account results, under a variety of oil 
price scenarios. Imports for 2008 are running at an annual rate of $43.2 billion. If the price of 
Venezuelan oil stays approximately the same for the next two months, then the average price for 
2008  will  be  $90.37,  thus  providing  export  revenue  of  92.9  to  101.8  billion  dollars  for  2008, 
corresponding to exports of 2.62 to 2.89 million barrels per day.
14 This would yield a trade surplus of 
49.7 to 58.6 billion dollars for 2008, or an enormous 15.0 to 17.7 percent of GDP, assuming $43.2 
billion in imports. 
 
For 2009, taking first the high range of projected prices for Venezuela’s oil --$90 -- we get export 
revenue of between $92.6 to 101.4 billion (again based on 2.62 to 2.89 million barrels per day). This 
results in a trade surplus of between $46.4 and 55.2 billion, or a very large 10.5 to 12.5 percent of 
GDP.
15 (For these estimates we assume that imports grow by 7 percent annually).  For 2010, we get 
a trade surplus  between $43.1 and 51.9 billion, or 7.2 to 8.7 percent of GDP.
16 
                                                 
11 PDVSA reports a proposed “financing scale between 5% and 50% of the oil bill” for PetroCaribe (PDVSA, n.d.) 
12 Venezuelan Energy and Petroleum Ministry (2008). 
13 Goldman Sachs (2008), Goldstein (2008), IEA (2008). 
14 These figures include US $6.5 billion in non-petroleum exports (Banco Central de Venezuela, 2008). 
15 GDP estimates are based on the IMF’s (October 2008) projections for nominal GDP in 2008-2010, in domestic 
currency (current bolivares), converted to dollars at the present fixed exchange rate of 2.15 bolivares fuertes to the 
dollar. If the currency is devalued, as the IMF and some other analysts assume it will be, then Venezuela’s nominal GDP 
measured in dollars would be correspondingly lower. 
16 Agence France-Press (2008), Lewis and Lawler (2008), and Lesova (2008). Center for Economic and Policy Research  • 5 
 
TABLE 1 
Venezuela’s Trade Balance under Various Price and Export Volume Scenarios 
Scenario A: Venezuelan oil averages $90 per barrel in 2009 and 2010         
  2008    2009    2010 
Export Volume
1
  2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89 
Venezuelan Oil Price
2  $90.37   $90.37     $90.00   $90.00     $90.00   $90.00  
GDP (Bill. USD)  331.8  331.8    440.5  440.5    598.3  598.3 
Imports
3                 
     Billions of USD  43.2  43.2    46.2  46.2    49.5  49.5 
     Percent of GDP  13.0%  13.0%    10.5%  10.5%    8.3%  8.3% 
Exports
4                 
     Billions of USD  92.9  101.8    92.6  101.4    92.6  101.4 
     Percent of GDP  28.0%  30.7%    21.0%  23.0%    15.5%  17.0% 
Trade Balance                 
     Billions of USD  49.7  58.6    46.4  55.2    43.1  51.9 
     Percent of GDP  15.0%  17.7%     10.5%  12.5%     7.2%  8.7% 
 
Scenario B: Venezuelan oil averages $80 per barrel in 2009 and 2010         
  2008    2009    2010 
Export Volume
1  2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89 
Venezuelan Oil Price
2  $90.37   $90.37     $80.00   $80.00     $80.00   $80.00  
GDP (Bill. USD)  331.8  331.8    440.5  440.5    598.3  598.3 
Imports
3                 
     Billions of USD  43.2  43.2    46.2  46.2    49.5  49.5 
     Percent of GDP  12.9%  12.9%    13.0%  13.0%    13.3%  13.3% 
Exports
4                 
     Billions of USD  92.9  101.8    83.0  90.9    83.0  90.9 
     Percent of GDP  28.0%  30.7%    18.8%  20.6%    13.9%  15.2% 
Trade Balance                 
     Billions of USD  49.7  58.6    36.8  44.7    33.5  41.4 
     Percent of GDP  15.0%  17.7%     8.4%  10.1%     5.6%  6.9% 
 
Scenario C: Venezuelan oil averages $70 per barrel in 2009 and 2010       
  2008    2009    2010 
Export Volume
1  2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89 
Venezuelan Oil Price
2  $90.37   $90.37     $70.00   $70.00     $70.00   $70.00  
GDP (Bill. USD)  331.8  331.8    440.5  440.5    598.3  598.3 
Imports
3                 
     Billions of USD  43.2  43.2    46.2  46.2    49.5  49.5 
     Percent of GDP  12.9%  12.9%    13.0%  13.0%    13.3%  13.3% 
Exports
4                 
     Billions of USD  92.9  101.8    73.4  80.3    73.4  80.3 
     Percent of GDP  28.0%  30.7%    16.7%  18.2%    12.3%  13.4% 
Trade Balance                 
     Billions of USD  49.7  58.6    27.2  34.1    23.9  30.8 
     Percent of GDP  15.0%  17.7%     6.2%  7.8%     4.0%  5.2% 
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TABLE 1, Continued 
Venezuela’s Trade Balance under Various Price and Export Volume Scenarios 
 
Scenario D: Venezuelan oil averages $60 per barrel in 2009 and 2010         
  2008    2009    2010 
Export Volume
1  2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89 
Venezuelan Oil Price
2  $90.37   $90.37    $60.00   $60.00     $60.00   $60.00  
GDP (Bill. USD)  331.8  331.8    440.5  440.5    598.3  598.3 
Imports
3                 
     Billions of USD  43.2  43.2    47.52  46.2    49.5  49.5 
     Percent of GDP  12.9%  12.9%   13.0%  13.0%    13.3%  13.3% 
Exports
4                 
     Billions of USD  92.9  101.8    63.9  69.8    63.9  69.8 
     Percent of GDP  28.0%  30.7%   14.5%  15.8%    10.7%  11.7% 
Trade Balance                 
     Billions of USD  49.7  58.6    16.4  23.6    14.4  20.3 
     Percent of GDP  15.0%  17.7%    3.7%  5.4%     2.4%  3.4% 
 
Scenario E: Venezuelan oil averages $50 per barrel in 2009 and 2010       
  2008    2009    2010 
Export Volume
1  2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89     2.62  2.89 
Venezuelan Oil Price
2  $90.37   $90.37    $50.00   $50.00     $50.00   $50.00  
GDP (Bill. USD)  331.8  331.8    440.5  440.5    598.3  598.3 
Imports
3                 
     Billions of USD  43.2  43.2    47.52  46.2    49.5  49.5 
     Percent of GDP  12.9%  12.9%   13.0%  13.0%    13.3%  13.3% 
Exports
4                 
     Billions of USD  92.9  101.8    54.3  59.2    54.3  59.2 
     Percent of GDP  28.0%  30.7%   12.3%  13.5%    9.1%  9.9% 
Trade Balance                 
     Billions of USD  49.7  58.6    6.8  13.0    4.8  9.7 
     Percent of GDP  15.0%  17.7%    1.5%  3.0%     0.8%  1.6% 
Sources: IMF (2008), Venezuelan Central Bank (2008), author’s calculations. 
Notes: 
1. Export volume is measured in millions of barrels per day. 
2. If Venezuelan oil continues at its latest week's average price, $52.96, through the rest of 2008, the year's average 
will be $90.37 
3. Import estimates assume an annual 7 percent increase.   
4. These figures include US$6.5 billion in non-petroleum exports. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, if the price of Venezuelan oil falls to $80 a barrel, the country would still 
run a huge trade surplus of 8.4 to 10.1 percent of GDP for 2009, and 5.6 to 6.1 percent of GDP for 
2010. At $70 a barrel, this surplus is still large at 6.2 to 7.8 percent of GDP for 2009, and 4.0 to 5.2 
percent of GDP for 2010. At $60 a barrel, this surplus is reduced to 3.7 to 5.4 percent of GDP for 
2009, and 2.4 to 3.4 percent of GDP for 2010.   
 
Even at $50 per barrel, Venezuela would still run trade surpluses through 2010.  However, this is 
considered to be an extremely unlikely scenario by economists who forecast oil prices.
17  
 
                                                 
17 See note 12, above. Center for Economic and Policy Research  • 7 
 
The current account surplus for 2007 was $20.0 billion, as compared to a trade surplus of $23.7 
billion. Thus, including the other items in the current account does not alter the basic picture. 
Venezuela’s foreign debt is only nine percent of GDP, and interest payments on the debt are 2.2 
percent of GDP, or currently $7.4 billion annually.
18 There are no principal payments due on global 
bonds either this year or next.  
 
It is clear that Venezuela can be expected to run current account surpluses for the foreseeable 
future, even at oil prices far below the levels that are currently forecasted by any experts in the field. 
However, even if the economy were to somehow fall into a current account deficit, the government  
has  $40  billion in reserves at the Central Bank and another $37 billion in other hard currency 
assets.





In light of the above data, it is difficult to foresee a scenario in which oil prices would fall far enough 
for Venezuela to run up against foreign exchange constraints due to loss of export revenue. Clearly 
there is also room for imports to grow faster than we assumed here, and Venezuela would still have 
current account surpluses under foreseeable scenarios.  Also, the Venezuelan government controls 
access to foreign exchange, and could limit the growth of imports if it needed to, although there 
would not seem to be any need for this in the foreseeable future. 
 
For these reasons, the government should be fully able to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy in 
order  to  make  up  for  any  slowdown  in  consumer  or  capital spending, and keep the economy 
growing at a healthy pace. Problems with inflation can be expected to subside, since the price of 
imported goods can be expected to fall as a result of a rapidly decelerating global economy. The 
price of food commodities has dropped dramatically alongside of oil.
20 Although as noted above 
there are few direct transmission mechanisms of the global financial crisis and economic slowdown 
to the Venezuelan economy, the first half of 2008 has shown a fall in capital spending (some of 
which appears to be government capital spending). Also there will be likely be some cutbacks in 
private spending due to falling confidence in the regional and world economy generally.  
 
It  is  therefore  important  that  the  government  consider  taking  the  appropriate  fiscal  stimulus 
measures,  including  deficit  spending  as  necessary,  to  avoid  unnecessary  declines  in  the  rate  of 
growth of output and employment. In the past, developing countries have too often taken pro-
cyclical  measures  –  i.e.  tighter  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  –  that  have  worsened  economic 
slowdowns brought on by external shocks. An important exception has been China, which grew 
rapidly right through the last major financial crisis (1998-2000) while its neighbors suffered huge 
losses in output and employment. China’s success was a result of expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policy, especially the hundreds of billions of dollars that the government invested in infrastructure 
during  this  period.  China  is  now  pursuing  similar  policies  in  response  to  the  current  world 
slowdown; this week the government announced a $587 billion stimulus package – about 7 percent 
of GDP – over the next two years. 
                                                 
18 Finance Ministry (2008), IMF (2008). 
19 Banco Central de Venezuela (2008), Bancaribe (2008). 
20 Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index (2008). Oil Prices and Venezuela’s Economy • 8 
 
As noted above, developing countries have often been held back from pursuing the appropriate 
fiscal  and monetary policies in the face of slowing aggregate demand, due to foreign exchange 
constraints. It is clear from the above data that Venezuela is far from experiencing such constraints 
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